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ABSTRACT
With the development of human rights and anti-discrimination law,
courts have increasingly been called upon to protect ethnicity-
related practices from general criminal and civil sanctions. These
‘claims of culture’ have so far been addressed with remarkable
inconsistency, leading to popular fears of unlimited normative
pluralism and targeted legislative measures. Compounding such
controversies, philosophical approaches to multiculturalism have
mostly been concerned with policy and offered vague or distorted
portrayals of judicial challenges. This article seeks to fill the gap by
exploring how the legal standard of substantive equality might
structure the courts’ approach to a range of cases involving
minority litigants. In particular, I will argue that ethnic practices
can be usefully divided into four categories triggering distinct
modes of legal reasoning: criminal offences, human rights
violations, civil infractions, and symbolic identification. In the first
case, cultural differences mainly bear on the analysis of subjective
blameworthiness, whereas in the second, they bring out an
ongoing shift in the public/private and negative/positive nature of
human rights obligations. Civil infractions call for the application
of anti-discrimination standards developed in the doctrine of
indirect discrimination and reasonable accommodation. As for
symbolic identification, it raises the issue of national identities and
legal instruments to make them inclusive of the whole citizenry.
KEYWORDS
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I. Introduction
In April 2013, the Belgian Council of State nullified a primary school regulation prohibit-
ing the display of religious symbols by all teachers, except those of religious or moral sub-
jects within the classroom. Two months later, the same court unexpectedly refused to
suspend an administrative circular issued by the Board of Flemish Community Schools,
similarly banning conspicuous ‘philosophical’ signs (except during relevant classes).1
Almost simultaneously, a Dutch Cantonal Court cancelled a fine imposed on an ortho-
dox Jew for not carrying his identity document on the Sabbath, accepting that Jewish
© 2016 Norwegian Centre for Human Rights
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1European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field, ‘News from the EU Member States, the FYR of Mace-
donia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Turkey’ (2014) 18 Eur Anti-Discrimination L Rev 47, 49–50. On 14 October 2014,
the Court decided it had no competence to cancel the circular but annulled its transposition in specific schools. See Euro-
pean Network of Legal Experts in Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination, ‘Key Developments at National Level in Legis-
lation, Case Law and Policy’ (2015) 1 Eur Equality L Rev 74, 79.
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norms prohibit the transportation of any private object into the public domain on this day.
In the midst of a political controversy, the public prosecutor lodged an appeal at the Dis-
trict Court, which found that identification requirements allowed no religious exemptions
and consequently restored the fine.2
In 2009, the Superior Court of New Jersey exonerated a Moroccan Muslim from crim-
inal liability for raping his wife, arguing that he did not
have a criminal desire to or intent to sexually assault or sexually contact the plaintiff when he
did […]. He was operating under his belief that it is, as the husband, his desire to have sex
when and whether he wanted to, was something that was consistent with his practices and it
was something that was not prohibited [sic].3
The decision was overturned two years later on the grounds that the defendant was aware
of the victim’s lack of consent ‘regardless of his view that his religion permitted him to act
as he did’.4
As these recent cases show, two decades of rigorous academic debate on what has been
called the “claims of culture”,5 usually framed in the language of religious freedom and
non-discrimination, have not impeded the proliferation of contradictory, apparently
unprincipled judicial approaches. Such unpredictability has not only left courts open to
charges of bias against minorities, especially Muslims,6 but also catalysed regressive legis-
lative reforms seeking to restrict judicial discretion or increase penalties for ethnicity
related offences. For example, several European countries have specifically defined
female genital mutilation as a criminal offence;7 culturally connoted laws have also
been introduced against polygamy, forced marriages, honour killings and the imposition
of the full veil.8 In the United States, around two-dozen states have proposed bills that
would prevent judges from taking foreign or international law into consideration,
especially Sharia.9 In Quebec, religious exemptions from administrative regulations trig-
gered a protracted polemic that culminated in the appointment of a high-profile consulta-
tive commission.10 The commission’s extensive report did not settle the issue, however,
and nationalists subsequently campaigned on a law that sought to prevent civil servants
from manifesting their faith at work and restrict the adaptation of public services to reli-
gious demands.11 The initiative was tabled after the formation of a liberal government.
2European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field, ‘News from the EU Member States, the FYR of Mace-
donia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Turkey’ (2013) 17 Eur Anti-Discrimination L Rev 49, 75.
3SD v MJR, 2 A 3d 412 (NJ Super Ct App Div 2010).
4ibid.
5S Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2002).
6P Danchin, ‘Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 32 Michigan J of Intl Law 663; A
Cebada Romero, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Religion: Between Christian Neutrality and the Fear of Islam’
(2013) 11(1) The New Zealand J of Public and Intl Law 75.
7A Solanes Corella, ‘Human Rights and Conflicts in European Multicultural Societies’ (2013) 7(1) Migraciones Internacionales
72.
8See inter alia the Canadian Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act (18 June 2015) and the French Loi n° 2010-
1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public (Art 4).
9E Kim, ‘Islamic Law in American Courts: Good, Bad, and Unsustainable Uses’ (2014) 28(1) Notre Dame J of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy 287.
10P Bosset, ‘La “crise” des accommodements raisonnables: Regards d’un juriste sur le rapport Bouchard-Taylor’ (2009) 3(2)
Revue de droit parlementaire et politique 323.
11Charte affirmant les valeurs de laïcité et de neutralité religieuse de l’État ainsi que d’égalité entre les femmes et les
hommes et encadrant les demandes d’accommodements, draft bill no 60 introduced by Bernard Drainville, Minister
of Democratic Institutions and Citizen Participation.
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These worrying developments show the need for a morally defensible, legally plausible
and politically appealing approach to determine the extent to which courts should protect
practices that are rooted in minority cultural norms or traditions (henceforth labelled
‘ethnic’). By combining various disciplinary insights into multiculturalism, this article
seeks to illuminate the moral issues at stake in judicial responses to ethno-cultural
claims. This is done through the prism of substantive equality, understood as a legal prin-
ciple that sometimes allows or mandates status-based differential treatment aimed at the
emancipation of discriminated social categories. Since the discussion is intended as an
exercise in applied legal philosophy, it will not delve into the specificities deriving from
domestic legal traditions, statutes, institutions and political environments. I will,
however, rely on the fast-growing body of comparative research on the ways in which
courts resolve conflicts between ethnic practices and general regulations. These analyses
have shown that judicial approaches cannot be reduced to all-or-nothing decisions
(whether to protect or forbid the practice) and may lead to a wide array of sanctions.
They have also provided valuable insights into recurring problems and cross-national
trends. In particular, legal developments propitiated by the European Union and the
Council of Europe are given special attention, both for the breadth of their scope and
their capacity to reflect a degree of consensus among a variety of consolidated democra-
cies. This being said, it is indisputable that some courts may be more reluctant than others
to accept, implicitly or explicitly, the moral and sociological arguments that underpin the
following recommendations. Even then, and provided these arguments can withstand
critical scrutiny, they could still prove useful as a guide for future legislative reforms.
As many other theorists of multiculturalism, I start from Kymlicka’s canonical attempt
to reconcile liberalism with the deliberately non-neutral Canadian strategy of cultural gov-
ernance.12 One of Kymlicka’s key innovations was the demarcation of national, indigenous
and immigrant minority claims, the latter being described as a right to express cultural
identities in the public sphere rather than to set up parallel institutions.13 Kymlicka also
recognised that some historically marginalised groups such as African Americans and
the European Roma straddled uneasily the ethnic/national boundary, so that his theory
did not offer clear guidance on how to fairly deal with them. Acknowledging this, the fol-
lowing discussion will confine itself to the treatment of post-1945 immigrants and their
offspring in the western context.
Another limitation of Kymlicka’s theory was the somewhat impressionistic depiction of
legal (as opposed to political) dilemmas and responses. This stood out starkly in his analy-
sis of the limits of toleration, based on a differentiation between permissible ‘external pro-
tections’ and unacceptable ‘internal restrictions’.14 Internal restrictions were equated with
human rights violations, but there was no explanation about how these should be ident-
ified and sanctioned.15 More recently, Kymlicka has asserted that multiculturalism was
unlikely to clash with liberal values due to a broad consensus on the latter’s legitimacy
and the consolidation of human rights institutions.16 Whereas the first assumption
12W Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford,1995).
13ibid 15.
14ibid 35–44.
15ibid 170. This contrasts with Kymlicka’s extensive discussion on the legitimacy of federal judicial decisions regarding
human rights violations within national minorities.
16W Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (OUP, Oxford, 2007) 93.
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disregards pervasive disputes on the relative weight and interpretation of liberal prin-
ciples,17 the second precludes rather than furthers the critical analysis of rights adjudica-
tion. As we will see, similar difficulties have plagued subsequent efforts to build on or
refine Kymlicka’s proposals.
In order to highlight the importance (as well as the challenge) of incorporating ethnicity
as a factor in judicial reasoning, the following section develops my understanding of sub-
stantive equality and links it to a moral commitment to avoid the perpetuation of ethnic
subordination through adjudication. In Part III I will address four categories of ethnic
practices (criminal offences, human rights violations, civil infractions and symbolic identi-
fication) and unpack the key normative dilemmas courts are likely to face in each case.
II. Substantive Equality
The judicial standard of substantive equality is a still-young offspring of the anti-
discrimination principle established in domestic and international law over the past
half century, mainly as a result of feminist and anti-racist struggles. Early interpretations
of this principle stipulated that non-elective characteristics, such as sex and race, should
not affect the way people were treated by the state and other powerful actors.18 Although
the aim of the anti-discrimination principle was to create opportunities for disadvantaged
social categories, its conception as difference-blindness was also mobilised in legal com-
plaints against policies of positive (or affirmative) action. In addition, it left the door open
for the implementation of formally neutral rules and procedures with exclusionary
effects.19 In response, courts started to develop more context-sensitive and result-
oriented anti-discrimination standards, which allowed for the justified consideration of
immutable personal characteristics in judicial cases. In the European context, these ‘sub-
stantive equality’ approaches currently take various forms. While some courts merely
require differential treatment to be rationally supported by a legitimate aim, others
focus on the universal distribution of important public goods, the prevention and correc-
tion of status harms or the general duty of public and private organisations to promote
equal opportunities.20
In an influential attempt to unify and justify these standards, Fredman has advanced
that the differential treatment of subordinated social categories can be regarded as sub-
stantive equality when it benefits them on four interrelated dimensions: redistribution,
recognition, transformation and participation. Redistribution is primarily concerned
with resources and benefits, including representation in jobs, pay levels and access to
credit and property. Recognition refers to the elimination of status-based stereotyping,
humiliation and violence. Transformation aims to remove historically biased institutions
that turn differences into a detriment. As for participation, it relates to the inclusiveness of
political and other spheres of decision-making where minorities have traditionally been
absent.21
17P Bosset, ‘Complex Equality, Ambiguous Freedoms: Lessons from Canada (and Québec) on Human Rights in Plural
Societies’ (2011) 29(1) Nordic J of Human Rights 448.
18P Brest, ‘Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle’ (1976) 90(1) Harvard L Rev 1–54.
19O Fiss, ‘Groups and the Equal Protection Clause’ (1976) 5(2) Philosophy & Public Affairs 107.
20C McCrudden and S Prechal, The Concepts of Equality and Non-Discrimination in Europe: A Practical Approach (European
Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2009).
21S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn OUP, Oxford, 2011) 25–33.
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In many ways, this morally appealing framework evokes the complex conceptions of
social justice propounded by critical theorists such as Young and Fraser since the
1990s.22 According to these thinkers, earlier theories focusing on the exercise of civil lib-
erties and the distribution of material goods23 failed to bring into view other decisive
sources of unequal freedom, above all the stereotypes and discrimination attached to
characteristics such as sex, race, sexual orientation, sexual identity, disability and age. In
order to redress such injustices, public bodies had a moral duty to modify cultural
values that systematically hampered the social participation of stereotyped groups.24
Since material deprivation, biased institutions and powerlessness generally contributed
to the perpetuation of status inequalities, these should also be addressed, together with
the ‘intersectional’ disadvantages experienced by individuals belonging to multiple stigma-
tised social categories.25
The conditions thus giving rise to claims of recognition have many parallels in the situ-
ation of western immigrants and their descendants, as current sociological research
suggests. The ‘outsider’ status of recent arrivals, compounded by their legal subordination,
political exclusion and economic exploitation,26 often crystallises in ideologies that
magnify their differences in order to legitimate their domination.27 A range of ethnic
cues, especially race, dress, religious practices, accent, place of residence, and name,
become a basis for systematic discrimination in everyday interactions.28 Be they blatant
or subtle, these micropatterns eventually burden immigrants’ economic incorporation,
political participation, educational achievement, social inclusion and psychological adap-
tation.29 While some of them capitalise on family and other resources to get ahead in
society, others are condemned to live at the margins and pass on the stigma to future
generations.30
Despite these circumstances, the inclusion of ethnicity among the morally objectionable
grounds of discrimination could be rejected on the basis that, unlike the other character-
istics, it can and does change over time, in a largely inevitable process of assimilation that
may sometimes facilitate socioeconomic mobility.31 Immigrants and their children com-
monly trade foreign-sounding names for local ones, learn mainstream dialects, move to
middle-class neighbourhoods, adopt conventional dress codes, privatise, adjust or
22I Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990); N Fraser, ‘From Redis-
tribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a Post-Socialist Age’ (1995) 1(212) New Left Rev 1.
23J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edn OUP, Oxford, 1999).
24N Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’ (2000) 3 New Left Rev 113.
25MJ Añón Roig, ‘The Antidiscrimination Principle and the Determination of Disadvantage’ (2014) 2 The Age of Human
Rights J 109; K Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimina-
tion Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ [1989] The University of Chicago Legal Forum 139.
26J de Lucas, ‘La herida original de las políticas de inmigración. A propósito del lugar de los derechos humanos en las polí-
ticas de inmigración’ (2002) 26 Isegoría 59.
27A Rea and M Tripier, Sociologie de l’immigration (La Découverte, 2003) 77–91.
28M Banton, ‘The Sociology of Ethnic Relations’ (2008) 31(7) Ethnic and Racial Studies 1267.
29A Portes and R Rumbault, Immigrant America: A Portrait (3rd edn University of California Press, London, 2006); M Marti-
niello and J Rath, An Introduction to Immigrant Incorporation Studies: European Perspectives (Amsterdam University Press,
Amsterdam, 2014); K Fangen, T Johansson and N Hammarén (eds), Young Migrants: Exclusion and Belonging in Europe
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012).
30On the social position of the second generation, see M Crul and H Vermeulen, ‘The Second Generation in Europe’ (2003)
37(4) International Migration Rev 965; A Heath, C Rothon and E Kilpi, ‘The Second Generation in Western Europe: Edu-
cation, Unemployment, and Occupational Attainment’ (2008) 34 Annual Rev of Sociology 211; A Portes, P Fernández-
Kelly and W Haller, ‘The Adaptation of the Immigrant Second Generation in America: A Theoretical Overview and
Recent Evidence’ (2009) 35(7) J of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1077.
31H Gans, ‘Acculturation, Assimilation and Mobility’ (2007) 30(1) Ethnic and Racial Studies 152.
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abandon their religious practices, and otherwise become indistinguishable from the rest of
the population.32 After some generations, they may even forget about their foreign origins,
which cease to play any role in their self-understanding.33 Of course, an exception would
need to be made for race, the ethnic marker par excellence, which is not amenable to this
sort of adaptation. But this, critics would say, only reinforces the point: rather than getting
distracted by culture, defenders of social justice should focus their efforts on the ‘real’
problem of racism.
The mutability of ethnic practices certainly offers a convincing reason to avoid putting
them on the same legal footing as sex, race, sexual orientation, sexual identity, disability, or
age. In fact, and despite the frequent mention of ethnicity alongside these other prohibited
grounds of discrimination in treaties and statutes, multiculturalist philosophers invariably
accept that not all its manifestations deserve accommodation. On the contrary, it is taken
for granted that some of themmight collide with basic moral principles and should thus be
discouraged or even outlawed.
Nevertheless, at least three weighty arguments support the limited, but freestanding,
protection of ethnicity through substantive equality standards. First, there are practical,
cognitive, and affective limits to individuals’ capacity to acculturate. Foreign names, sur-
names and accents cannot be changed easily; ethnic solidarities often provide much-
needed social capital for newcomers; and disengagement from one’s cultural heritage
has been linked to a number of psychosocial problems.34 Second, transnational commit-
ments and deterritorialised identities are an inevitable by-product of global flows in goods,
services, ideas and people.35 While some of their manifestations might need to be regu-
lated in the interest of national and local communities, their existence should be accepted
as a normal fact of life. Third, the partial overlap between national, linguistic, religious and
racial identities frequently leads to a self-reinforcing cycle of ethnic subordination and
racialisation.36 An illustration of this can be found in the various labels currently attached
to European Muslims, alternatively referred to as ‘Arabs’, ‘Turks’, ‘Pakistanis’, ‘Maghrebis’
and so on.37 To avoid the transformation of ethnocentrism into full-fledged racism, the
disproportionate exclusion of immigrants and their children from social, educational,
economic and political institutions should be forestalled by all available means.
The substantive equality justification for ethnic accommodation partly diverges from
other prominent approaches that focus on the value of cultural diversity, sense of group
32E Morawska, ‘In Defense of the Assimilation Model’ (1994) 13(2) J of American Ethnic History 76; R Alba and V Nee, Remak-
ing the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
2003).
33H Gans, ‘The Coming Darkness of Late-Generation European American Ethnicity’ (2014) 37(5) Ethnic and Racial Studies
757.
34J Berry, ‘Stress Perspectives on Acculturation’ in D Sam and J Berry (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Acculturation Psy-
chology (CUP, Cambridge, 2006); J Phinney and others, ‘Ethnic Identity, Immigration, and Well-Being: An Interactional
Perspective’ (2001) 57(3) J of Social Issues 493; K Chun, P Balls Organista and G Martin (eds), Acculturation: Advances
in Theory, Measurement and Applied Research (American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C., 2003).
35P Levitt and N Glick Schiller, ‘Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society’ (2004) 38
(3) International Migration Rev 1002; K Knott and S McLoughlin (eds), Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities (Zed
Books, London, 2010); T Faist, ‘Diversity: A New Mode of Incorporation?’ (2009) 32(1) Ethnic and Racial Studies 171.
36I Settles and N Buchanan, ‘Multiple Groups, Multiple Identities, and Intersectionality’ in V Benet-Martínez and YY Hong,
The Oxford Handbook of Multicultural Identity (OUP, Oxford 2014); M Banton, ‘A Theory of Social Categories’ (2011) 45(2)
Sociology 187; A Wimmer, ‘The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory’ (2008) 113(4)
American J of Sociology 970.
37D Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’ (2006) 29(2) Ethnic and Racial Studies 331; N Meer, ‘Racialization and Religion: Race,
Culture and Difference in the Study of Antisemitism and Islamophobia’ (2013) 36(3) Ethnic and Racial Studies 385.
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belonging, individual conscience or self-esteem.38 However, it resonates with the egalitar-
ian thrust of Kymlicka’s theory and has been gaining ground in political philosophy.39
Moreover, this article assumes that it provides an appropriate framework for the protection
of religious practices, which have traditionally enjoyed stronger constitutional and inter-
national safeguards than other manifestations of cultural difference. Apart from reflecting
a critical shift in moral and legal philosophy,40 this will circumvent the intractable problem
of determining whether a given practice is ‘merely’ cultural or ‘authentically’ religious.
From the perspective of substantive equality, it is the stigma attached to these identities
that makes them significant, since it exposes their bearers to systematic discrimination
and reduced autonomy. Starting from this premise, the following section will examine
how courts should incorporate it into a range of cases that concern ethnic practices.
III. Incorporating Substantive Equality in Legal Reasoning
Conceptually, a ‘lexical order’ precedes my classification of ethnic practices. I thus assume
that criminal offences will be treated within the framework of the criminal law, regardless
of whether they also constitute human rights violations (as is often the case) or civil infrac-
tions. Symbolic identification is usually adjudicated after being sanctioned as a civil infrac-
tion, of which it constitutes a specific and lexically prior subcategory. Finally, courts may
ban a practice in the light of constitutional or international human rights standards when
neither criminal nor civils laws have already done so.
(i) Criminal offences
In western legal systems, ethnic practices that come into conflict with the criminal law
generally leave a small margin for judicial accommodation. Cultural issues have nonethe-
less arisen in cases of female genital mutilation, marital rape and violence, honour killings,
child abuse, animal maltreatment and drug possession or trade, among others. While
some practices are closely linked to a specific geographic, national or religious back-
ground, others largely transcend such boundaries. Their ethnic component derives from
the particular circumstances in which they take place, which may align them with the
norms of the offender’s family or community.41
38B Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000); A Eisenberg,
Reasons of Identity: A Normative Guide to the Political & Legal Assessment of Identity Claims (OUP, Oxford, 2009); A Robin-
son, Multiculturalism and the Foundations of Meaningful Life: Reconciling Autonomy, Identity and Community (UBC Press,
Vancouver, 2007); C Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in A Gutmann (ed), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Rec-
ognition (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994); A Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of
Social Conflict (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995).
39W Kymlicka, ‘The Theory and Practice of Immigrant Multiculturalism’, in Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multicul-
turalism, and Citizenship (OUP, 2001).
40See J Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia UP, New York, 1993); J Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion (Polity Press,
Cambridge, 2008) 251–70; K Alidadi and MC Foblets, ‘Framing Multicultural Challenges in Freedom of Religion Terms:
Limitations of Minimal Human Rights for Managing Religious Diversity in Europe’ (2012) 30(4) Netherlands Q of
Human Rights 460; H Bielefeldt, ‘Misperceptions of Freedom of Religion or Belief’ (2013) 35 Human Rights Q 33; A Scol-
nicov, The Right to Religious Freedom in International Law: Between Group Rights and Individual Rights (Routledge, Abing-
don, 2011).
41J Van Boeck characterises a cultural offence as ‘an act by a member of a minority culture, which is considered an offence
by the legal system of the dominant culture. The same act is nevertheless, within the cultural group of the offender,
condoned, accepted as normal behaviour and approved or even endorsed and promoted in the given situation’: see ‘Cul-
tural Defence and Culturally Motivated Crimes (Cultural Offences)’ (2001) 9(1) Eur J of Crime, Crim L and Crim Justice 1, 5.
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Multiculturalist philosophers have been slow in confronting criminal law issues. This is
hardly surprising, given their overriding interest in dispelling the notion that minority cul-
tures pose a threat to public order or values. Normative dilemmas have thus often been
dispatched through the classically liberal, but notoriously slippery, harm principle. For
example, Modood postulates that cultural tolerance should not ‘cause harm to others’,
arguing that moral requirements set limits to such things as child sacrifice, cannibalism
and widow self-immolation. He also concedes that ‘what this means in practice will some-
times be unclear and contested’.42 Similarly, in his comparison of female genital mutilation
and other bodily alterations such as breast enlargement, liposuction, facelift and piercing,
Carens concludes that the former should be prohibited because of its health risks. As one
moves from infibulation to superficial forms of circumcision, however, the moral judge-
ments become less obvious.43 Eisenberg also argues that the harm principle is a hurdle
that cultural practices must overcome in order to benefit from an accommodation.
Given that ‘all sorts of harmful or otherwise objectionable practices might nonetheless
be viewed as important to a group’s identity and even validated by the group’,44 she
then adds that institutions should remain vigilant about the reasons, evidence, and criteria
by which harm is assessed. In an attempt to limit the discriminatory stretching of the
concept, Renteln proposes to circumscribe it to the domain of irreparable physical
harm, which would primarily include loss of life and permanent disfigurement.45
References to the harm principle as the ultimate frontier of cultural accommodation
seem to rest on a distorted understanding of the role it plays in criminal law. In its original
form, it was formulated as a reaction to states’ excessive recourse to legal coercion. Seeking
to keep state power within moral limits, Mill advanced that the only purpose for which it
could rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community against her will
was to prevent harm to others. This doctrine left out of legislators’ legitimate reach
such matters as self-inflicted injuries, subjective happiness or personal morality (at least
in the case of an otherwise healthy adult).46 In this sense, the harm principle aimed to pin-
point actions that should not be criminalised rather than those that should; it had an
exclusive, not an inclusive character.47 Contemporary theorists likewise agree that the
vast majority of wrongs should be addressed with less intrusive means than the criminal
law.48 Paradoxically, multiculturalists who require ethnic cultures to be harmless thus end
up advocating a more punitive stance than the prevailing one.
A correct interpretation of the harm principle might be used to support the decrimina-
lisation of apparently benign practices such as the use of soft drugs. For democratic
reasons, however, decisions about which harms are serious enough to entail criminal sanc-
tions are generally left to legislatures rather than criminal courts.49 As recently
42T Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007), 67.
43J Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (OUP, Oxford, 2001)
147–48.
44Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity (n 38) 38.
45A Renteln, The Cultural Defense (OUP, Oxford, 2004) 218.
46JS Mill, On Liberty (1859) cited in HLA Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (OUP, Oxford, 1963) 4.
47J Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others (OUP, Oxford, 1984) 4; A Brudner, ‘Agency and Welfare in
the Penal Law’ in S Shute, J Gardner and J Horder (eds) Action and Value in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, 1993) 21–22.
48A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th edn OUP, Oxford, 2006) 22–55.
49This is not to say that no constitutional limit should be set on the validity of culturally connoted criminal laws. However,
this is unlikely to happen during criminal proceedings, due to the high costs in terms of legal certainty. The democratic
failings that might justify the nullification of a biased criminal statute are addressed in the section on civil infractions.
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acknowledged in an outstanding discussion by Kymlicka and colleagues, judicial dilemmas
therefore do not hinge on the consequences of particular traditions, but on the determi-
nation of defendants’ blameworthiness. Together with a host of other circumstances, cul-
tural information can be critical in order to establish general defences such as those of
mistake, provocation, duress, necessity, and self-defence, which can lead to complete
acquittal, conviction for a lesser wrong or sentence mitigation.50
The problem is that many jurisdictions make it extremely difficult for defendants to
successfully introduce this information in court. Apart from general procedural issues,
such as the admissibility of expert testimonies, the main obstacle has been the subordina-
tion of justifications and excuses to objective standards of ‘reasonableness’ that usually
reflect judges’ own cultural background. For instance, a Mexican-American man who
shot and killed an indebted poker partner after being told in Spanish to ‘fuck [his]
mother’ (‘chinga tu madre’) was denied a provocation excuse that would have reduced
his conviction from murder to manslaughter, since the average American would not
have been so offended by the insult.51 Cultural norms can also bear on the judgement
of crimes whose definition includes a specific intent, as is sometimes the case for sexual
abuse (sexual gratification) and assault (inflict physical harm). Failure to consider the
diverging meaning of a given action in different cultures could lead courts to take this
intent for granted, hence finding guilt when there is none. Such misunderstandings
have arisen in several cases involving parenting methods, including the touching of a
child’s genitals, ritual scarification and the use of traditional medicine.52
While there may be good reasons to avoid a purely subjective approach to the assess-
ment of blameworthiness, including citizens’ long-term duty to foresee and avert possible
harms,53 there is no obvious one to consider ethnicity-influenced mental states as less
reasonable than the rest. To the extent that courts routinely adjust their standards of
reasonableness to defendants’ situation, which may include their profession, experience,
age and so on,54 ethnicity should be explicitly taken into account among the factors
that can shape cognitive, affective, and behavioural patterns.55
This being said, the admission of cultural evidence in criminal trials does not come
without risks. Apart from the question of legal universalism, which loses much of its
urgency once equality is seen as a substantive rather than merely procedural principle,
Phillips identifies three mutually reinforcing objections. First, since judges rarely have
an in-depth knowledge of ethnic groups’ internal norms and dynamics, culture can
easily be manipulated opportunistically. Second, successful cultural defences might
increase the vulnerability of those individuals – often minority women – who are
harmed by the practice. Third, they might expose non-western cultures to judicial stereo-
typing as violent, irrational, patriarchal, or otherwise uncivilised.56 This would be an ironic
50W Kymlicka, C Lernestedt and M Matravers, Criminal Law and Cultural Diversity (OUP, Oxford, 2014).
51A Renteln, ‘The Use and Abuse of the Cultural Defense’ in MC Foblets and Renteln (eds), Multicultural Jurisprudence: Com-
parative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense (Hart, Oxford, 2009) 65–66.
52A Renteln, The Cultural Defense (OUP, Oxford, 2004) 48–72.
53G Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (OUP, Oxford, 2000) 691–736; Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (n 48) 241–48.
54J Blomsma, Mens Rea and Defences in European Criminal Law (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2012) 54–58.
55See K Greenawalt, ‘The Cultural Defense: Reflections in Light of the Model Penal Code and the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act’ in Kymlicka et al, Criminal Law and Cultural Diversity (n 50) 153–76.
56A Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Culture (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007) 79–82.
NORDIC JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 297
twist of fate, given multiculturalists’ central concern with the elimination of ethnic preju-
dice and discrimination.
Based on a review of American and British cases, Phillips convincingly shows these
fears to be well founded. In fact, she notes, the most successful defences have been
those where the minority culture was depicted in patriarchal terms. The persuasiveness
of such portrayals seemed to rest on their affinity with widely held postcolonial or Orien-
talist worldviews, but also with judges’ own social environment: what mattered was thus
not ‘difference but sameness’.57 This is compounded by the fact that discrepancies between
foreign social practices and legal norms are easily overlooked in favour of the former,
leading to an overestimation of official support for illegal or waning traditions.58 Expert
witnesses or community elders can sometimes exacerbate the problem by offering exces-
sively conservative portrayals of prevailing customs.
Taken together, these insights point to the need for a procedural safeguard against the
admission of cultural evidence on discriminatory norms, with a view to reconcile the
pursuit of substantive equality for ethnic and other subordinated groups. For instance,
courts could refuse to consider arguments based on the premise that the defendant’s
culture attributes a given social role to women, children or elders, or that it condemns
specific sexual orientations or identities. They could also reject as unreasonable any cog-
nitive or affective pattern stemming from such assumptions. Cultural defences would thus
have to rely on traditions and ideologies that can be reconciled with principles of equal
human dignity and freedom.
Of course, this might initially seem counterintuitive: so many of our ideas about cul-
tural difference have to do with gender norms that their wholesale exclusion would appar-
ently come close to negating the cultural defence altogether. The proposed solution might
also convey the reassuring – but grossly mistaken – message that western societies have
overcome their gender biases. By singling out ethnicity-based inequalities as more proble-
matic than other variants, the rule would hold minorities to a higher moral standard than
the majority. However, these plausible points should not be exaggerated. On the one hand,
sexist and other discriminatory norms amount to a relatively small part of the individual
differences that may be rooted in a migrant background. On the other hand, the rule
would only apply to the very limited range of criminal cases that are presented as culturally
determined by the defence or the prosecution. As the next sections will show, this would
still leave plenty of room for the legal accommodation of minority gender norms.
Perhaps more fundamentally, the non-admissibility of evidence on culturally specific
biases would reflect the current reversal of legislative and judicial approaches to sexist
offences. Along with racism, heterosexism and other attitudes included in developing
‘hate crime’ laws, the sexist underpinnings of harmful practices are increasingly viewed
as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating circumstance or an excuse.59 In this
context, the exclusion of cultural evidence could actually serve defendants’ interests by
avoiding the unwarranted attribution of biased motives to minority offenders.
57ibid 98.
58C Chen, ‘A Critique of “Loss of Face” Arguments in Cultural Defense Cases: A Comparative Study’ in Foblets and Renteln,
Multicultural Jurisprudence (n 51) 247–61.
59Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hate Crime Laws: A Practical Guide (OSCE Office for Democratic Insti-
tutions and Human Rights, Warsaw, 2009).
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Considering some courts’ propensity to punish them with longer sentences,60 the ensuing
gains in procedural justice might be significant.
(ii) Human rights violations
While many criminal offences can be understood as transgressions of subjective rights,
such as the right to life or physical integrity, ethnic practices that do not entail criminal
liability might nonetheless violate internationally or constitutionally recognised human
rights. Once again, this is most likely to happen where traditions are invoked to subordi-
nate a ‘minority within the minority’,61 such as women or homosexuals, and/or suppress
dissent. In such cases, courts would presumably have to discourage their perpetuation
through less coercive means, such as nullifying a regulation, withholding benefits or
awarding damages, even in the absence of any explicit statutory prohibition. Depending
on the division of powers within jurisdictions, this could happen either in a specialised
constitutional court or in general civil courts interpreting constitutional and international
human rights law.
The multiculturalist literature often emphasises the need to balance cultural demands,
sometimes conceptualised as minority rights, against respect for (other) fundamental
rights. Poulter notes that religious freedom often appears to conflict with other rights,
and that significant insight could be gained from the standards embodied in international
conventions.62 Kymlicka also argues that the ‘human rights revolution’ has constrained
as well as stimulated multiculturalism, by requiring groups to advance their claims in
the language of liberalism, constitutionalism and equality.63 Less optimistically,
Waldron warns that ethnic assertiveness could multiply cases of ‘uncompossibility’,
whereby non-negotiable rights are claimed that cannot simultaneously be accommodated
within a single legal system.64 Eisenberg reaches the same conclusion from a diametri-
cally opposite perspective, criticising rights-based limits to accommodation for placing
damaging pressure on courts whose decisions to choose between competing rights
may appear arbitrary or biased.65 Driven by a preoccupation with gender discrimination,
Okin proposes that basic rights to ‘personal freedom’ and ‘legal equality in the most inti-
mate sphere of life’ should be guaranteed for all, ‘even those who abjure them for
themselves’.66
In diverse societies, fundamental rights undoubtedly provide a crucial reference point
for the construction of a shared public morality and the legitimisation of political insti-
tutions.67 Just like the harm principle, however, they can sometimes obscure rather
than illuminate the logic of judicial decisions on cultural accommodation. The image
they bring to mind, that of individual citizens pitted against each other over the scope
60M Siesling and J Ten Voorde, ‘The Paradox of Cultural Differences in Dutch Criminal Law’ in Foblets and Renteln, Multi-
cultural Jurisprudence (n 51) 164–68.
61A Eisenberg and J Spinner-Halev (eds), Minorities Within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity (CUP, Cambridge, 2004).
62S Poulter, Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience (OUP, Oxford, 1998) 118.
63Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys (n 16) 92–93.
64J Waldron, ‘Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility’ in W Kymlicka and W Norman (eds), Citizenship in Diverse Societies
(OUP, Oxford, 2000) 159.
65Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity (n 38) 74.
66S Moller Okin, ‘Multiculturalism and Feminism: No Simple Question, No Simple Answers’ in Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev,
Minorities Within Minorities (n 61) 87.
67Solanes Corella, Human Rights and Conflicts (n 7) 70.
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of their respective liberties, seldom comes to life in courtrooms. The primary reason for
this can be traced back to a basic feature of rights adjudication: in an overwhelming
majority of cases, it is concerned with state rather than private action.68
The fact that public authorities usually stand accused of human rights violations makes
it extremely unlikely for an ethnic tradition to come under scrutiny. For this to happen, the
practice would need to be performed by a given authority and then contested in court by
its presumed victim. But ethnic minorities, almost by definition, typically lack the power to
shape the functioning of public schools, hospitals, social services, police forces, prisons and
so on. To be sure, courts have often had to assess tensions between individual rights and
state-sponsored religions, but the latter were those of the majority.69 When minority
believers have been involved in human rights litigation, it has almost invariably been as
claimants rather than defendants.70 A noteworthy exception is the case of Grant v
Canada,71 where three police veterans challenged a dress code that allowed Sikh officers
to wear a religious turban instead of the conventional headgear. The plaintiffs alleged
that the exemption was incompatible with the Canadian Charter of Rights since it
infringed the religious freedom of citizens who interacted with them and discriminated
against their non-Sikh colleagues. The court found no interference with religious
freedom and non-discrimination and therefore did not need to determine whether
culture could justify it.
This situation is likely to change, however, due to the progressive jurisprudential
expansion of rights-based obligations. As state duties of restraint or respect are comple-
mented with those of protection and fulfilment, public authorities are increasingly
required to shield individuals against the breach of their rights by private parties.72
This could open up for the argument that failure to prohibit a given ethnic practice
might be in violation of a third party’s rights. Courts would thus have to balance, for
instance, states’ duty to respect minorities’ religious freedom and their obligation to
protect some other fundamental right. Once again, such an exercise would not be
without precedent, since long-established religions have often sought exemptions from
regulations aiming to empower children, women, homosexuals or dissenters in
general, either among the faithful or in the larger population. The striking overall
result of these struggles is that associational autonomy or freedom of conscience has reg-
ularly had the upper hand on competing rights to equality, freedom of expression, family
life, and so on.73
68Of course, this does not hold for the application of civil laws embodying human rights principles, which are addressed
below. See R McCorquodale, ‘Non-State Actors and International Human Rights Law’ in S Joseph and A McBeth (eds),
Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010) 97–114; F Michelman, ‘Consti-
tutions and the Public/Private Divide’ in M Rosenfeld and A Sajó, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law
(OUP, Oxford, 2012).
69For recent ECtHR cases, see Folgerø and Others v Norway App no 15472/02 (ECtHR 29 Jun 2007); Lautsi v Italy App no
30814/06 (ECtHR 3 Nov 2009); Lautsi and Others v Italy App no 30814/06 (ECtHR 18 Mar 2011).
70See inter alia Choudhoury v United Kingdom App no 17439/90 (Commission Decision, 5 Mar 1991); Dahlab v Switzerland
App no 42393/98 (ECtHR 15 Feb 2001); Dogru v France and Kervanci v France Ap no 27058/05 and 31645/04 (ECtHR 4 Mar
2009).
71[1995] 1 FC 158.
72S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP, Oxford, 2008) 65–91.
73A McColgan, ‘Religion and (In)equality in the European Framework’ in L Zucca and C Ungureanu (eds), Law, State and
Religion in the New Europe: Debates and Dilemmas (CUP, Cambridge, 2012); K Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution:
Free Exercise and Fairness (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006).
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However, growing anxieties about radical Islam are currently putting pressure on such
extensive interpretations of religious freedom, especially in Europe.74 For instance, the
European Court of Human Rights has drawn a clear line between the absolute ‘internal’
dimension of religious freedom and its much more qualified ‘external’ counterpart,
which can easily be curtailed in the name of legitimate interests (such as the good
functioning of a public or private organisation).75 As a result, it has so far refused to
order religious exemptions from general laws, except in cases of conscientious objection
to military service.76 Concurrently, the EU employment equality directive has significantly
narrowed the legal space for discrimination in religious bodies, such as private schools and
hospitals, despite an ambiguous provision allowing them to ‘require their employees to act
in good faith and with loyalty to the organisation’s ethos’.77
To the extent that it contributes to removing some of the structural limitations on
autonomy that subordinated social categories, including believers, encounter in various
spheres of life, this shift should be promoted as a step in the direction of substantive equal-
ity.78 In all western societies, religious organisations wield significant power as employers,
providers of public services, coordinators of civil society, owners of media outlets and pro-
moters of cultural heritage.79 Because of their wide reach, any institutionalised bias in their
mode of functioning is bound to have a real impact on individual citizens’ economic
opportunities, political influence and social status.80 Even from the perspective of minority
religions, it is hard to see how their image could be improved by allowing influential
members to put illiberal doctrines into practice. This being said, it should be born in
mind that states’ legal duty to protect is a progressive one and does not always entail
the imposition of sanctions on individuals or private organisations. Therefore, traditional
norms may sometimes be allowed to interfere with individual rights regardless of religious
freedom concerns. For instance, anti-discrimination laws usually leave out non-contrac-
tual interpersonal relationships and membership requirements in civil society organis-
ations. Where such exemptions exist, religious individuals and bodies should enjoy the
same leeway as secular ones until higher standards are enacted.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned correlation between private rights and public
duties, it cannot be ruled out that courts might also face the task of balancing the protec-
tion of ethnicity and individual rights in a private dispute. A number of constitutions
explicitly recognise rights’ horizontal enforceability against private parties, either as a
general rule, an exception, or when there is a legislative ‘gap’. When such a mention is
74M Malik, ‘The “Other” Citizens: Religion in a Multicultural Europe’ in Zucca and Ungureanu, Law, State and Religion (n 73);
M Maussen and V Bader, ‘Non-Governmental Religious Schools in Europe: Institutional Opportunities, Associational Free-
doms, and Contemporary Challenges’ (2015) 51(1) Comparative Education 1.
75European Court of Human Rights Research Division, Overview of the Court’s Case-law on Freedom of Religion (Council of
Europe 2013) [16].
76ECtHR, Guide sur l’article 9: Liberté de pensé, de conscience et de religion (Council of Europe, 2015) [52]–[61], [64].
77Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment
and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16, art 4.2. For a critical discussion, see L Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimi-
nation and the Workplace (Hart, 2008) 54–78.
78M Sunder, ‘Keeping Faith: Reconciling Women’s Human Rights and Religion’ in J Witte and C Green (eds), Religion &
Human Rights: An Introduction (OUP, Oxford, 2011).
79For some examples, see F Messner and P Shah (eds), Public Funding of Religions in Europe (Ashgate, Farnham, 2015).
80MC Foblets, K Alidadi, J Nielsen and Z Yanasmayan (eds), Belief, Law and Politics: What Future for a Secular Europe?
(Ashgate, Farnham, 2014).
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absent, human rights can still be used as a guide to interpret private law.82 Even in the
United States and Canada, where constitutional guarantees are explicitly restricted to
‘state action’, these innovations are already influencing family law, the focal point of a vig-
orous debate about the recognition of religious forms of divorce.83 In 2007, a Maryland
court refused to enforce a talaq divorce performed at the Pakistani embassy in Washing-
ton on the grounds that it did not confer sufficient due process to the wife.84 The same
approach was adopted two years later by the Oakland Circuit Court, which rejected an
Indian talaq despite the fact that the couple had only lived in the US for two years.85
The incipient character of such rights-based restrictions on contractual freedom pre-
cludes any definitive assessment as to their long-term impacts on substantive equality. To
the extent that they considerably expand the scope of judicial discretion, however, there
is a possibility that stereotypes and misunderstandings might lead to the prohibition of
harmless or largely beneficial practices among ethnic minorities. Some signs of this are
already emerging. In France and Belgium, formalist interpretations of gender equality
have made it extremely difficult for Muslim foreign nationals, including women, to
obtain recognition of an international divorce.86 In the Netherlands and other places,
fears of maltreatment or abduction have led courts to withdraw child custody fromminority
fathers, undermining family bonds and paradoxically reinforcing traditional gender roles.87
Measures against forced marriages have also served to restrict young adults’ access to family
reunification.88 If these trends persist, the double-edged sword of human rights runs the risk
of falling in the hands of the powerful, striking against those it was forged to protect.
(iii) Civil infractions
Conflicts between ethnic norms and civil regulations are by far the most frequently dis-
cussed in multiculturalist theory, to the point of eclipsing criminal and human rights
issues. Such frictions are also the most likely to arise, given the sheer number of rules
that are adopted, amended and suppressed every day in the array of public and private
organisations that educate, heal, entertain, protect, feed or inform citizens. Unlike criminal
and constitutional provisions, these rules typically lack intrinsic moral status. Their prima
facie legitimacy flows from the way in which they are adopted, either by a democratically
accountable body or a legally authorised contracting party. Since they mainly address
82D Oliver and J Fedtke, Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study (Routledge, Abingdon, 2007) 467–511; C
O’Cinneide and M Stelzer, ‘Horizontal Effect/State Action’ in M Tushnet, T Fleiner and C Saunders (eds), Routledge Hand-
book of Constitutional Law (Routledge, Abingdon, 2013).
83P Bosset and P Eid, ‘Droit et religion: de l’accommodement raisonnable à un dialogue internormatif?’ (2007) 41 Revue
juridique Thémis 513; A Shachar, ‘State, Religion, and the Family: The New Dilemmas of Multicultural Accommodation’
in R Ahdar and N Aroney (eds), Shari’a in the West (OUP, Oxford, 2010); J Nichols, ‘Multi-Tiered Marriage: Reconsidering
the Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion’, in Marriage and Divorce in a Multicultural Context: Multi-Tiered Marriage and the
Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion (CUP, Cambridge, 2012).
84Aleem v Aleem, 404 Md 404 947 A2d 489 (2008).
85Tarikonda v Pinjari no 287403 (Mich Ct App 2009).
86H Fulchiron, ‘Ne répudiez point: Pour une interprétation raisonnée des arrêts du 17 février 2004’ (2006) 58(1) Revue inter-
nationale de droit comparé 7; K Alidadi, ‘The Western Judicial Answer to Islamic Talaq: Peeking through the Gate of Con-
flict of Laws in the US and Belgium’ (2005) 5(1) UCLA J of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 1; MC Foblets, ‘Moroccan Women in
Europe: Bargaining for Autonomy’ (2007) 64(4) Washington and Lee L Rev 1385.
87P Dupont, ‘Del sexismo islámico al sexismo secular en la resolución de conflictos familiares’ in A Solanes Corella (ed),
Diversidad cultural y conflictos en la Unión Europea: Implicaciones jurídico-políticas (Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2015).
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problems of coordination in the long-term pursuit of individual or collective goals, any
immediate harm caused by their modification will usually to be limited in nature.89
A non-exhaustive list of ethnic practices that have collided with civil regulations
includes withdrawing children from physical or sexual education classes; observing
non-official religious holidays and opening businesses on official ones; building places
of worship; celebrating festivals in public spaces; objecting to autopsies; performing funer-
ary, hygienic or slaughtering rituals; consuming animals that are usually kept as pets; and
entering or maintaining a polygamous marriage.90 As Bouchard and Taylor usefully point
out, only a handful of such incompatibilities make it all the way to a court of justice. The
vast majority are dealt with through informal negotiations among the parties concerned,
leading either to the adaptation or the uniform application of rules.91 It is only in the latter
scenario that claimants may resort to courts in order to invalidate or be compensated for
the regulation. The question then becomes, what are the moral grounds on which such
demands can be met? What are the circumstances, if any, when culture cannot only
justify but even require differential treatment?
First, let us consider the objections to cultural accommodation in civil cases. In Culture
and Equality, Barry recalls that any law is bound to disproportionately hurt those who
favour the prohibited conduct: for instance, only smokers will have their freedom curtailed
by non-smoking restaurants. Therefore, a law’s disparate impact is not sufficient reason to
reject it as unfair, at least as far as dynamic cultural preferences (as opposed to immutable
characteristics, such as disability) are concerned.92 Admittedly, prudential and ethical con-
siderations might make it advisable to revise procedures which adversely affect a specific
group. However, the difficulty of applying different rules to different people would make it
preferable to redesign the procedure rather than conceding exemptions. This would
remove accommodation claims from the judicial arena and bring them back into a politi-
cal negotiation where competing interests could be voiced and perhaps reconciled.93
Multicultural sceptics have not been alone in advocating political over juridical sol-
utions to cultural conflicts, emphasising the value of communicative processes. In their
report, Bouchard and Taylor explicitly favour what they call the ‘citizen route’ in order
to lighten the burden on courts, stimulate individual responsibility and promote exchange
and reciprocity.94 While acknowledging the attractiveness of a legal model that consist-
ently protects vital interests from the vicissitudes of the political process, Williams also
concludes that an inclusive dialogue among all affected parties would better serve the
interests of justice.95 Deliberative approaches have likewise been championed as a way
of fostering mutual understanding and fair consideration of diverse viewpoints, increasing
the legitimacy of governance structures, improving leaders’ accountability, redressing
imbalances in communicative resources, drawing attention away from abstract principles
and toward concrete problems, ensuring the viability of proposed reforms, promoting the
89J Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (OUP, Oxford, 1979) 162–77.
90Depending on the jurisdiction, some of these practices may fall in the category of criminal offences. An extensive com-
pilation of ethnicity-related normative conflicts can be found in G Bouchard and C Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for
Reconciliation (Government of Quebec, 2008) 45–75.
91ibid 64.
92B Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001) 34–38.
93ibid 39–50.
94Bouchard and Taylor, Building the Future (n 90) 64.
95M Williams, ‘Justice Toward Groups: Political Not Juridical’ (1995) 23(1) Political Theory 67.
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internal contestation of cultural norms and empowering subordinated group members.96
At the same time, many deliberative theorists have acknowledged the structural
inequalities that may affect minorities’ ability to make themselves heard. For instance, citi-
zens might lack a genuine commitment to the common good and, therefore, the will to
moderate or sacrifice their self-interest for the sake of satisfactory long-term arrange-
ments. Socioeconomic disadvantages and limited access to education, technology and
the media can hinder minorities’ capacity and motivation to advocate their cause in a con-
vincing manner.97 In the migration context, restrictive citizenship regimes often deprive a
large proportion of minority residents from the right to vote.98 Moreover, their represen-
tatives may seek to maintain internal hierarchies and silence the most vulnerable.99 The
results of such pitfalls have been well documented in the literature on integration
policy. As long as dominant groups do not perceive ethnic demands as a threat to their
interests, decision-makers tend to dismiss them as irrelevant or temporary. In favourable
circumstances, this either leads to the absence of policy responses or to paternalistic
measures that mainly reflect majority concerns.100 Despite attempts by academics, elite
media, bureaucrats, human rights activists and business representatives to uphold
ethnic bashing taboos,101 mainstream parties frequently end up replicating popular dis-
courses that portray immigrants as salary dumpers, benefit scroungers, cultural aliens
or potential criminals.102 The framing of ethnic problems as security issues in turn legit-
imises illiberal policies with detrimental effects on intergroup relations, such as the deten-
tion of religious leaders, the imposition of compulsory citizenship courses, the
introduction of cultural requirements in naturalisation procedures and the large-scale
deportation of undocumented residents.103
If minority voices are easily stifled in democratic debates, things may get worse in more
hierarchical private organisations where cultural diversity is routinely resisted through
harassment, normalised discrimination, avoidance and neglect. Instead of preventing
96J Valadez, Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy, and Self-Determination in Multicultural Societies (Westview Press,
Oxford, 2001) 117–45; A Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights (CUP, Cambridge,
2004) 117–45; M Deveaux, Gender and Justice in Multicultural Liberal States (OUP, Oxford, 2006) 89–126; S Song,
Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism (CUP, Cambridge, 2007) 41–84.
97Valadez, Deliberative Democracy (n 96) 39–85.
98J de Lucas, ‘Integración política, participación y ciudadanía: Un balance’ (2007) Entelequia 271.
99Deveaux (n 96) 112–19; Song (n 96) 82–84.
100H Mahnig, ‘The Politics of Minority-Majority Relations: How Immigrant Policies Developed in Paris, Berlin and Zurich’ in
Penninx and others, Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrant, Local Politics and Integration Policies (Ashgate, Aldershot,
2004).
101G Freeman, ‘Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States’ (1995) 29(4) Intl Migration Rev 881–902; C
Boswell, ‘Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way?’ (2007) 41(1) Intl Migration Rev 75; C Boswell, The Political
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Parties and Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe’ (2008) 15(3) J of Eur Public Policy 315; R Zapata-Barrero, Fun-
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ethnicity-related conflicts, managers often let them simmer or pigeonhole minorities into
subordinated units that reduce their influence and possibilities of advancement.104 When
measures are taken to address their concerns and increase their status, majority workers
may feel unfairly disadvantaged and stymie change.105 Depending on the context,
union attitudes can range from broadly supportive to blatantly xenophobic.106
For all these reasons, deliberations on the adaptation of existing institutions to ethnic
claims often fail to deliver fair outcomes. Instead of creating opportunities for mutual
understanding and cooperation, they produce dogmatic defences of established conven-
tions and interested distortions of minor differences. To overcome this problem, Levy
advocates for the development of multicultural ‘manners’, understood as an ability to
give way, renounce to a legitimate aspiration or accept that losing an argument is not
the same as being wrong.107 Similarly, Laden calls for the substitution of the ‘logic of nego-
tiation’, where opponents see themselves as obstacles standing in the way of each other’s
goals, by the ‘logic of deliberation’, where opposing reasons are thoroughly considered
with a view to maximise long-term cooperation.108 De Lucas vindicates the need to take
other cultures seriously and avoid prejudging them as incompatible with established
customs, democracy and the rule of law.109
Summarising these views, Maclure asserts that the principle of ‘respect for reasonable
cultural diversity’ has entered the liberal egalitarian conception of justice, complementing
related rights to freedom of conscience, association and non-discrimination.110 This prin-
ciple seems to have made some headway into the legal field, where two key innovations
have contributed to improve the deliberative position of ethnic minorities. The first and
most decisive is the prohibition of indirect discrimination, alternatively referred to as ‘dis-
parate impact’ or ‘adverse effect’ discrimination. Initially formulated by the US Supreme
Court interpreting the 1964 Civil Rights Act,111 the concept was subsequently incorpor-
ated into a number of laws, including the EU racial equality directive adopted in
2000.112 Indirect discrimination is generally defined as a formally neutral practice with
a disproportionate (or unjustified) negative impact on a disadvantaged social category.113
While disparate impact can normally be established straightforwardly through common
sense or statistics, court approaches to proportionality have been fluctuating between
strict necessity tests and much lighter requirements of a rational link between the practice
104K Thomas and V Plaut, ‘The Many Faces of Diversity Resistance in the Workplace’; M Davidson and K Proudford, ‘Cycles of
Resistance: How Dominants and Subordinates Collude to Undermine Diversity Efforts in Organizations’ both in K Thomas
(ed), Diversity Resistance in Organizations (Lawrence Erlbaum, New York 2008).
105E James and others, ‘Prejudice Matters: Understanding the Reactions of Whites to Affirmative Action Programs Targeted
to Benefit Blacks’ (2001) 86(6) J of Applied Psychology 1120; V Plaut and others, ‘What About Me? Perceptions of Exclusion
and Whites’ Reactions to Multiculturalism’ (2011) 101(2) J of Personality and Social Psychology 337.
106J Wrench, Diversity Management and Discrimination: Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in the EU (Ashgate, Aldershot,
2007) 81–82.
107J Levy, ‘Multicultural Manners’ in Michel Seymour (ed), The Plural States of Recognition (Palgrave, New York, 2010).
108A Laden, ‘Negotiation, Deliberation, and the Claims of Politics’ in A Laden and D Owen (eds),Multiculturalism and Political
Theory (CUP, Cambridge, 2007).
109J De Lucas, ‘Condiciones jurídicas y políticas del proyecto intercultural en España’ (2005) 21 Anales de Historia Contem-
poránea 161.
110J Maclure, ‘Respect for Reasonable Cultural Diversity as a Principle of Political Morality’ in Michel Seymour (ed), The Plural
States of Recognition (Palgrave, New York, 2010).
111United States Supreme Court, Griggs v Duke Power (1971) 401 US 424.
112Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000, implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespec-
tive of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22, art 2(b).
113Fredman, Discrimination Law (n 21) 178; N Bamforth, M Malik and C O’Cinneide, Discrimination Law: Theory and Context
(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008) 290.
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and a legitimate aim.114 Such assessments usually rely on a highly contextual analysis of
the functions performed by an organisation, the social environment in which it is
immersed and the predictable consequences of changing its functioning.
The relevance of indirect discrimination for the accommodation of ethnic differences
recently came to light in the case of a Danish Muslim who was forced to quit a vocational
training programme in nutrition after refusing to taste pork. Filing a claim of discrimi-
nation on grounds of religion, she highlighted her willingness to touch and prepare the
pork and argued that her beliefs would not interfere with her work, as colleagues would
always be there to taste if the need arose. In its ruling, the Danish Equal Treatment
Board acknowledged her good faith, stressed that the requirement to eat pork would
prevent her from completing her education and concluded that it was not proven to be
necessary. The plaintiff was awarded a compensation of €10,000, subsequently reduced
to €5,400 by a local city court.115
A very similar case was handled in 2006 by the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission,
which had to assess the rejection of a Muslim applicant for the job of customer manager
who refused to shake hands with women. The employer argued that this would obstruct
his relationship with clients. Accepting the link between the applicant’s religious beliefs
and his opposition to handshakes, the Commission found indirect discrimination on
the grounds that other means could have been used to promote customer-friendliness
and sexual equality. This conclusion was reached through a highly contextualised demon-
stration of employer bad faith: no one had ever complained about not receiving a hand-
shake, the business lacked a specific policy on customer treatment and it had failed to
consider any alternative mode of interaction. In another case of handshake-related reli-
gious discrimination two years later, the Court of Rotterdam took the opposite position,
reflecting the fact-sensitive nature of proportionality analyses.116
As these cases show, avoiding indirect discrimination often entails allowing an exemp-
tion from a general rule or taking specific steps in order to reconcile organisational pro-
cesses with ethnic norms.117 This has been the starting point of the reasonable
accommodation doctrine, developed through American legislation118 and adopted by
Canadian courts as a complement to the prohibition of religious discrimination.119
According to this doctrine, public and private bodies have a duty to accommodate prac-
tices that do not cause ‘undue hardship’, an open-ended concept that takes into account
the financial costs borne by the organisation, its size and mode of functioning, prevailing
security standards, the coordination of human resources and the protection of important
public interests.120 For instance, public authorities or private employers could be required
114Bamforth et al (n 113) 313–30; Fredman, Discrimination Law (n 21) 183–96.
115European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field, ‘News from EU Member States, Croatia, the FYR of
Macedonia, Turkey, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway’ (2012) 15 Eur Anti-Discrimination L Rev 43, 53; European Network
of Legal Experts (n 2) 56.
116C Tobler, Limits and Potential of the Concept of Indirect Discrimination (Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, 2008) 64. In 2010, the District Court of Stockholm imposed over €6,000 in damages to the national employ-
ment agency for sanctioning an applicant who had refused to shake a prospective employer’s hand. European Network of
Legal Experts, ‘News from the EU Member States’ (2013) (n 2) 49, 85.
117On the commonality between the prohibition of indirect discrimination and the duty to accommodate, see C Jolls, ‘Anti-
discrimination and Accommodation’ (2001) 115 Harvard L Rev 641.
118Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, SEC 2.7.
119O’Malley v Simpsons-Sears [1985] 2 SCR 536.
120Bosset and Eid, ‘Droit et religion’ (n 83).
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to provide minority religious classes, confessional schools, prison chaplains, single-sex
public pools, foreign-language education or media, translation services, vegetarian, halal
or kosher food, separate cemeteries, adapted medical treatments, male or female
doctors, teachers or caretakers, or public housing for extended families.121 While
resting on the same concern for reasonableness as the proportionality test, the ‘undue
hardship’ test places a greater burden on organisations to think creatively about new
rules and methods that might suit minority employees and users. As more substantive
conceptions of equality take root in European social and legal norms, however, the distinc-
tion between both standards may become increasingly blurred.122
Ultimately, the prohibition of indirect discrimination and the duty of reasonable
accommodation both oblige decision-makers to devote time and resources to the design
of ethnicity-friendly institutions. In this sense, they can go some way in resolving the
lack of minority participation that tends to undermine the legitimacy of general regu-
lations in diverse societies. These legal standards do not seek to guarantee a concrete
good or right, but to provide minorities with a last-ditch opportunity to express their argu-
ments and receive a fair hearing. After taking into account all the interests at stake, includ-
ing a wide range of practical concerns and foreseeable effects on third parties, judges try to
determine if the plaintiff was treated as an equal or, to put it differently, without prejudice.
This is inevitably a delicate exercise, not least because the weight and rationality of defen-
dants’ justifications are typically hard to assess. Moreover, the principle of judicial restraint
might make it preferable to err on the side of permissiveness. Even then, the mere possi-
bility of judicial review may put pressure on all organisations to design more inclusive
decision-making procedures, for instance by consulting minorities more regularly and
ensuring they are adequately represented in senior positions.123 If only for this reason,
the principle of ‘respect for reasonable cultural pluralism’ has an important role to play
in the legal theory of substantive equality, along with the other fundamental rights that
promote equal-status dialogue and compromise.
(iv) Symbolic identification
Among all the ethnic practices whose civil prohibition has been contested in court, the
display of identity symbols stands out both for the tremendous amount of political atten-
tion it has received and the specific normative issues it raises. Markers of ethnicity are reg-
ularly used in order to achieve positive distinctiveness, cultivate a sense of historical
continuity, command group solidarity, catalyse political mobilisation, take part in cultural
traditions and many other reasons. Depending on the function they play, they can be more
or less permanent or linked to specific situations such as a family reunion, a religious cel-
ebration or a demonstration.124 Contrary to a long-held view, many studies have shown
121Most of these examples are drawn from Bouchard and Taylor, Building the Future (n 90) 45–75.
122P Bosset, ‘Droits de la personne et accommodements raisonnables: le droit est-il mondialisé?’ (2009) 62 Revue interdis-
ciplinaire d’études juridiques 1; MC Foblets, ‘Freedom of Religion and Belief in the European Workplace: Which Way
Forward and What Role for the European Union?’ (2013) 13(2-3) Intl J of Discrimination and the Law 240; E Ruiz
Vieytez, Las prácticas de armonización como instrumentos de gestión pública de la diversidad religiosa (Observatorio del
Pluralismo Relisioso en España, Madrid, 2012) 31–32.
123M Jézéquel, ‘The Reasonable Accommodation Requirement: Potential and Limits’ in Council of Europe, Institutional
Accommodation and the Citizen: Legal and Political Interaction in a Pluralist Society (Council of Europe Publishing, Stras-
bourg, 2009) 21.
124M Verkuyten, The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity (Psychology Press, 2005) 74–90.
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that ethnic identification often goes hand in hand with a strong willingness to participate
in the wider society. In this sense, ethnic and national identities should be seen as separate
constructs whose mutual influence depends on a number of contextual variables, such as
social expectations, institutional arrangements and discrimination.125 Symbolic ethnicity
also tends to endure much longer than more demanding cultural commitments, such as
political activism or active engagement in religious, educational or folklore associations.126
To the extent that ethnic self-identification largely boils down to intangible concerns
about seeing and being seen, it is striking to see how much hostility it has aroused in
western societies. Foreign-language commercial signs, minarets and sukkahs (temporary
huts built outside homes to celebrate the Jewish festival of Sukkot) are some of the
visible ethnic manifestations that have met with resistance from public authorities and
ordinary citizens. However, most of the controversies have focused on the even more
“purely” symbolic aspect of ethnic dress or styles, including Sikh turbans, Jewish yar-
mulkes, Rastafarian dreadlocks and, over and above all, Muslim veils. Despite their differ-
ences, debates on these practices tend to mobilise highly speculative arguments tied to
national ideologies and ‘philosophies of integration’.127 Moreover, these arguments have
not only sought to maintain existing norms but also to impose new requirements of cul-
tural assimilation.
Because of its protracted nature and regressive outcome, the French headscarf contro-
versy is especially illustrative in this respect.128 The nationwide debate broke out in 1989,
when three Muslim girls were expelled from a secondary school for wearing the veil. This
triggered a series of statements on French identity and Islam, spurring the Minister of
Education to request an advisory opinion from the State Council. The corresponding
ruling stated that religious symbols worn by students in public schools did not compro-
mise state secularism and should thus be allowed unless they disrupted educational activi-
ties, or were used in a conspicuous manner to proselytise or protest. Educational
authorities had to determine the presence of such factors on a case-by-case basis.129
In 2003, an expert commission was appointed to carry out audiences and provide rec-
ommendations on the principle of secularism. Its final report prescribed a mix of prag-
matic accommodation (in canteen menus, history classes and official holidays, for
instance) and hard-line republicanism, most notably by prohibiting “conspicuous” reli-
gious symbols in public schools.130 The latter recommendation was followed through
with the law of 15 March 2004 regulating, in application of the principle of secularism,
the wearing of signs or clothes displaying a religious affiliation in public primary and
125J Berry, ‘Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation’ (1997) 46(1) Applied Psychology 5; S Schwartz and others, ‘Rethink-
ing the Concept of Acculturation: Implications for Theory and Research’ (2010) 65(4) American Psychologist 237.
126H Gans, ‘Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America’ (1979) 2(1) Ethnic and Racial Studies 1.
127A Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (2nd edn Palgrave Mac-
millan, Basingstoke, 2001); C Bertossi, ‘National Models of Integration in Europe: A Comparative and Critical Analysis’
(2011) 20(10) American Behavioral Scientist 1.
128For detailed descriptions of these events, see P Simon and V Sala Pala, ‘We’re Not All Multiculturalists Yet’ in S Vertovec
and S Wessendorf (eds), The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices (Routledge, Abingdon,
2010); R Kastoryano, ‘French Secularism and Islam: France’s Headscarf Affair’ in T Modood, A Triandafyllidou and R Zapata-
Barrero (eds), Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach (Routledge, Abingdon, 2006); J Bowen,Why
the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008).
129Conseil d’État, Section de l’intérieur, 27 novembre 1989, n° 346893, Avis ‘Port du foulard islamique’.
130Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République, Rapport au Président de la République
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secondary schools.131 In a memorandum, the Ministry of Education explained that the ban
was meant to foster secularism, individual freedom and gender equality, as well as to
protect schools from communitarian demands and religious pressures.132 Revising its
earlier position, the State Council subsequently upheld the expulsion of two high school
pupils, one Muslim and one Sikh, despite the fact that they had substituted their respective
veil and turban with more modest proxies.133
As this turnaround illustrates, judicial approaches to the prohibition of ethnic symbols
have swung between the strict scrutiny of administrative regulations and the wholesale
endorsement of statutory laws,134 often justified by the aim of upholding a certain under-
standing of state neutrality or secularism. Relatedly, courts have been more inclined to
protect manifestations of faith in private organisations, which can hardly be cast as repre-
senting the state. The distinction was sharply drawn in two simultaneous decisions of the
French Court of Cassation concerning the dismissal of senior employees for breach of
anti-veil regulations. In the CPAM case, the employer was a medical insurance fund. Clas-
sifying this as a public service, the court ruled that the claimant’s right to wear the head-
scarf at work could legitimately be curtailed by the principle of state neutrality. In the Baby
Loup case, the plaintiff worked at a private day care centre for children. The court found
that its regulation could not be justified as a ‘genuine and determining occupational
requirement’ for the specific activities performed.135
Much of the multiculturalist discourse has consisted in challenging the cultural neu-
trality of the state, both as a reality and as an ideal.136 Applying this line of thinking to
the headscarf debate, multicultural theorists would denounce the arbitrary distinction
between conspicuous and non-conspicuous symbols, which shields taken-for-granted
dominant cultures from neutrality requirements, and the privilege enjoyed by secular
over religious identities. Moreover, they would stress that prevailing dress codes reflect
idiosyncratic conventions, be they European, national, modern, urban or middle-class,
that do not have any claim of universal validity. Since ethnic minorities sometimes
adhere to different conventions, they should be free to do so unless some consideration
other than neutrality makes it unadvisable.
The crucial shortcoming of this negative, anti-neutrality argument is that it leaves the
door open to an infinite number of alternative reasons to forbid the manifestation of
ethnic identities. As recent jurisprudence and political debates show, headscarf opponents
131Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues man-
ifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics.
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lycées publics.
133Conseil d’État, 4ème et 5ème sous-sections réunies, 5 Dec 2007, 285394, Publié au recueil Lebon; Conseil d’État, 4ème et
5ème sous-sections réunies, 5 Dec 2007, 295671, Publié au recueil Lebon.
134But see the German Constitutional Court decision of 27 January 2015, invalidating a provision in the North Rhine-West-
phalia Education Act prohibiting teachers in state schools to express their religious beliefs by outer appearance (Press
Release No 14/2015 of 13 March 2015).
135European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field, (2013) (n 2) 49, 59–60. The Court of Cassation sitting
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exposure to staff convictions. See M Peyronnet and C Radé, ‘The Ban on the Wearing of the Islamic Veil in Creches: the
Baby Loup Case’ (2015) 1 Montesquieu L Rev 1.
136P Bosset, A Gamper and T Öhlinger, ‘Multicultural Societies and Migration’ in M Tushnet, T Fleiner and C Saunders (eds),
Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (Routledge Abingdon, 2013); V Bader, K Alidadi and F Vermeulen, ‘Religious
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have been quick to capitalise on this weakness, creatively enriching their case with refer-
ences to the emancipation of women, conviviality, national cohesion, the fight against ter-
rorism and radicalism, health and safety issues, the legitimacy of public institutions,
expeditious security checks, the protection of children and so on.137 However flimsy
their empirical basis, such contentions have held sway for lack of a convincing counter-
vailing perspective.
In this somewhat gloomy context for ethnic identification, the glimmer of hope might
come from the forward-looking, consequentialist defences articulated by critical theorists
such as Galeotti and Laborde. Significantly, both have used the headscarf debate as a
primary source of normative reflection. According to Galeotti, the allowance of visible
ethnic practices should not only be based on their compatibility with liberal principles
or lack of interference with competing interests, but over and above all on their contri-
bution to the legitimation of despised identities. The very fact that they are often vehe-
mently rejected despite their lack of plausible negative consequences demonstrates that
they raise their own unique issues, qualitatively different from the practical inconveniences
that might stand in the way of other accommodations. By expressing their identities,
ethnic minorities challenge established conceptions of public normality, bringing out
into view a trait that had previously been forcibly confined to the private sphere. This
is generally perceived as a trespass on public neutrality, perhaps even as a threat to the
customs and status of the majority, and thus as a legitimate object of repression. The offi-
cial acceptance of ethnic differences would reverse this process by shifting the boundaries
of the normalised citizenry. Just like their concealment reinforces the stigma, their pres-
ence in public spaces would enhance their status.138
In the same vein, Laborde has criticised the French authorities for disregarding the ways
in which colour-blindness indirectly aggravates the ethnicisation of social relations by
consolidating an exclusive national ideal. In order to mainstream Muslim identities, she
argues, Frenchness should be detached from traditional lifestyles, culinary customs or aes-
thetic preferences. Young Muslims who disrupt the Republican model of a homogeneous
public sphere help achieve this by showing that one can be French and pray five times a
day, not enjoy wine and ham, and wear Islamic clothes. In other words, they teach their
friends and peers that national belonging and solidarity need not be synonymous with cul-
tural sameness, thus destabilising and possibly reconciling oppositional identities.139
There is considerable empirical support for the proposition that ethnic prejudice and
discrimination is often tied to the exclusiveness of national identities. According to the
social psychological theory of in-group projection, for instance, national prototypes
provide a number of values based on which individuals judge themselves and others. Per-
sonal traits that are perceived as ‘typically national’ thus tend to receive favourable
137P Bosset, ‘Mainstreaming Religious Diversity in a Secular and Egalitarian State: The Road(s) Not Taken in Leyla Sahin v
Turkey’ in E Brems (ed), Diversity and European Human Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR (CUP, Cambridge, 2013); A
Solanes Corella ‘Limiting Rights in Public Space: Women, Veils and Conviviality’ (2015) 31 Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filo-
sofía del Derecho 62; I Rorive, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European Answer’ (2009) 30(6)
Cardozo L Rev 2669; C Joppke, Veil: Mirror of Identity (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009) 53–80; C Evans, ‘The “Islam Scarf”
in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7 The Melbourne J of Intl Law 52; N Nathwani, ‘Islamic Headscarves
and Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the Relevant Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 25 Nether-
lands Q of Human Rights 221.
138A Elisabetta Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition (CUP, Cambridge, 2002) 85–114.
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evaluations, whereas ‘foreign’ ones are viewed negatively.140 This forebodes many difficul-
ties for ethnic minorities, who will inevitably be assessed against local standards by those
who identify with the majority. Fortunately, the model signals two possible remedies. The
first would consist in forswearing thick, clearly defined national identities, for instance by
recognising their internal tensions and contradictions. The second would require the sub-
stitution of monolithic national representations by more complex ones including multiple
prototypes or subgroups.141 In principle, both strategies seem to dovetail with Galeotti and
Laborde’s call for a greater visibility of ethnic differences in the public sphere.
Beyond national identities, ethnic symbols could also promote equality by multiplying
the attitudinal benefits of personalised intergroup contacts. Over the last decades, preju-
dice research has not only established the trust-building properties of cooperative inter-
actions,142 but also the conditions under which they must take place for their impact to
be maximised.143 One of these conditions consists in making the stigmatised trait as
salient as possible, fostering the perception that the individual being dealt with is represen-
tative of her social category. Failure to meet this condition might allow and even facilitate
the formation of interpersonal bonds, but ensuing attitudes will likely remain circum-
scribed at the individual level, leaving collective stereotypes intact.144
If the causal link between ethnic invisibility and prejudice is to be taken seriously, courts
should recognise a categorical distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic ethnic
practices, reserving for the latter the open-ended proportionality tests of indirect discrimi-
nation. As for the former, they should be protected by the much stricter necessity test
usually applied in cases of direct discrimination.145 On its own, this humble judicial inno-
vation could do more to promote substantive equality than many ambitious anti-racist
programmes.
IV. Conclusion
Since the mid-1990s, much thought has been given to the meaning of justice and legal
equality in culturally diverse western societies. Philosophers have sought to fill in the
blind spots of classical liberalism by discarding its assumption of a descent-based citizenry
and looking for ways to make institutions more hospitable to immigrants and their des-
cendants. Courts have attempted to strike a balance between adherence to general legal
rules and protection of religious freedom and non-discrimination. In the meantime,
empirical research has enriched our understanding of integration processes, both at the
individual level and as a part of broader structural dynamics. Despite all these insights,
140M Wenzel, A Mummendey and S Waldzus, ‘Superordinate Identities and Intergroup Conflict: The Ingroup Projection
Model’ (2007) 18 Eur Rev of Social Psychology 331.
141ibid 340. For an empirical test, see S Pehrson, V Vignoles and R Brown, ‘National Identification and Anti-Immigrant Preju-
dice: Individual and Contextual Effects of National Definitions’ (2009) 72(1) Social Psychology Q 24.
142T Pettigrew and L Tropp, ‘A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory’ (2006) 90(5) J of Personality and Social
Psychology 751.
143T Pettigrew, ‘Intergroup Contact Theory’ (1998) 49 Annual Rev of Psychology 65; T Pettigrew and L Tropp, ‘How Does
Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Meta-Analytic Tests of Three Mediators’ (2008) 38 Eur J of Social Psychology 922.
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chology 255.
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the legal accommodation of ethnic practices remains a disputed issue, leading to inconsist-
ent judicial responses, social anxiety and capricious legislation. This article has attempted
to clear the path for a more systematic approach, based on the normative standard of sub-
stantive equality and the demarcation of four legal categories: criminal offences, human
rights violations, civil infractions and symbolic identification.
Like sex, race, sexual orientation, sexual identity, disability and age, ethnicity tends to be
associated with many stereotypes, exposing its bearers to various forms of discrimination.
This provides a moral basis for its legal protection through emancipating forms of differ-
ential treatment. Compared to other protected characteristics, however, ethnicity is rela-
tively amenable to change. Therefore, some of its manifestations can legitimately be
discouraged in a way that would be unthinkable for less mutable traits. On the other
hand, ethnicity can be distinguished from other surmountable stigma by the fact that it
is acquired in childhood, serves important purposes, inevitably follows from global inter-
connections and frequently overlaps with race. These features suggest that a minimum
level of social justice can hardly be achieved without states’ active involvement in the nor-
malisation of cultural difference.
In some cases, the gap between ethnic and dominant norms is such that a minority
practice is legally defined as a crime. Although the amount of harm it causes may be dif-
ficult to assess, legislative bodies usually carry out harm analyses by balancing multiple
competing interests among the population they represent. For the courts, the core norma-
tive issue is the determination of blameworthiness, which depends on the link between a
defendant’s mental state and behaviour. Ethnic differences in attitudes and beliefs may
bear on general defences that can lead to an acquittal or mitigated punishment, but min-
orities are often prevented from introducing the relevant evidence due to culturally biased
requirements that the alleged state of mind be reasonable. Such requirements should be
relaxed or deprived of their ethnocentric character. However, an exception would need
to be made for discriminatory ethnic norms, whose admission in court could give free
rein to judicial stereotyping and erroneous psychological assessments. Depending on
the context, this would either lead to the lesser protection of subordinated social categories
or to misguided findings of hate crime.
Direct judicial evaluations of the compatibility between ethnic practices and fundamen-
tal rights are generally precluded by the fact that international and constitutional human
rights obligations primarily fall on public authorities, where minority norms have little
influence. With the expansion of states’ positive duties to protect rights against private
interference, however, courts may have to balance them with the obligation to respect reli-
gious or cultural freedom. In particular, the development of ‘horizontal’ anti-discrimi-
nation laws is currently putting pressure on the historical tolerance of rights-impinging
religious practices. To the extent that these interventions oblige powerful organisations
to increase the participation and status of women, homosexuals or (other) religious min-
orities, their judicial endorsement generally advances substantive equality. Conversely, the
direct application of human rights provisions in private disputes runs the risk of putting
judicial discretion at the service of majority sensitivities and colliding with the interests of
the subordinated individuals it purports to protect.
A vast majority of forbidden ethnic customs collide with civil regulations, whose moral
status depends on the process that leads to their adoption. In a society where ethnic min-
orities could exert proportional influence on the design of public and private institutions,
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no specific moral problem would arise from the prohibition of some of their practices.
Unfortunately, contemporary multicultural societies do not live up to this ideal. Reason-
able ethnic concerns are often neglected or strongly criticised, in part because positions of
power are controlled by the cultural majority and in part because prejudices impede a fair
assessment of the interests involved. The legal prohibition of indirect discrimination helps
counter these deliberative deficits by imposing a duty upon decision-makers to give min-
ority demands a fair hearing. While a wide range of legitimate aims may justify the rejec-
tion of an accommodation, courts are thus invested with a crucial mandate to remove
arbitrary and exclusionary conventions.
Restrictions on the display of ethnic symbols, including those with a religious element,
stand out as an especially widespread form of weakly justified constraint on cultural differ-
ence. Immigrants and their offspring may resort to these symbols to underscore their
specific identity in a number of contexts, regardless of their participation in the wider
society. Because of its stigmatised status, visible ethnicity is frequently perceived as a
threat to common values or state neutrality. Upon closer inspection, however, claims of
neutrality mask the fact that established institutions embody a number of idiosyncratic
preferences that cannot be framed in terms of universal principles. Moreover, the presence
of ethnic symbols in public spaces makes an important contribution to the long-term elim-
ination of racism. By expressing their distinctiveness, minorities transform national and
other collective identities, making them more inclusive of the whole citizenry. In the
course of their everyday interactions, they also disprove stereotypes and build intergroup
trust. These crucial social functions make it imperative for symbolic ethnicity to be legally
protected through the highest possible anti-discrimination standards. This would require
restrictions to be strictly necessary for the achievement of important objectives rather than
speculatively related to abstract principles.
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